Long Term Evolution (LTE) is the most recent standard in mobile communications, introduced by 3 rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). Most of the works in literature about LTE security analyze authentication procedures, while handover procedures are far less considered. This paper focuses on the procedures that are activated when a mobile device moves between different
Introduction
Fourth generation (4G) mobile networks are rapidly spreading out. Long Term Evolution (LTE), which is an evolution of the previous third generation (3G) Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS), is already available in many countries. For a considerable period of time these two technologies will 5 co-exist, because the new devices on the market, such as smartphones, at this time support both connection technologies.
Enabling seamless user mobility is a key factor in the LTE and UMTS standards defined by the 3GPP (3 rd Generation Partnership Project) [1] . Different procedures have been specified in order to ensure continuity of service to users 10 who move, for example, from an area which is covered by an LTE cell to an area covered by another adjacent LTE cell. Similarly, the standards define procedures to seamlessly move from an area where both 4G and 3G networks are available to an area with only 3G network coverage (or vice versa). In particular, these scenarios where different technologies are cooperating require non-trivial 15 procedures. In fact, an important difference between 3G and 4G networks is that the latter have a flat-IP architecture (all network devices communicate over IP technology), unlike 3G, where communications between devices use radio channels with multiple access technologies.
Formal verification is a well-known technique that can be used to perform a 20 thorough analysis of a communication protocol, in order to identify the presence of bugs in its design or to prove its correctness. In the case of cryptographic protocols, formal verification can identify possible attacks on the protocol or prove that no attacks are possible under certain assumptions. In the past, formal verification has already been applied to security protocols for mobile networks. 25 In particular, many works in the literature have formally analyzed the basic procedures for authenticating users in 3G and in 4G networks, while a smaller number of studies has been devoted to the procedures that allow user mobility in these networks. As a consequence, not all the possible mobility scenarios already have a formal analysis. payloads exchanged, and authentication between network components, we also analyse backward and forward secrecy of keys, conditional secrecy of payloads (i.e. secrecy that must hold only when optional encryption of data is enabled) and immunity from off-line guessing attacks. The results that have been obtained show that in some particular scenarios the aforementioned security properties are only 65 in part assured in the models that have been developed, which sheds some more light on the security of LTE handover procedures. In particular, in this paper we analyze particular situations that may arise because of misconfiguration errors in the operator networks or eNodeB nodes that are compromized by attackers (some LTE cells are especially designed in order to cover small areas and to 70 be placed in relatively easily accessible places, e.g. indoor premises). In these cases, confidentiality of user data traffic is not always provided, and the lack of authentication between network elements makes injection of fake signaling messages possible. This kind of result may be interesting especially for mobile operators, who have to assess security risks in their networks. 75 The remainer of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some background about the LTE and UMTS networks and about ProVerif, and Section 3 discusses related work. Section 4 introduces the main security properties that have to be ensured in the LTE-related handover procedures and discusses security threats. Then, Section 5 presents the formal modeling of procedures and 80 the formal property specifications based on ProVerif, while Section 6 presents the results of the formal analysis. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
Background

UMTS and LTE overview
This section presents the basic concepts of 3G and 4G mobile networks, which 85 are essential in order to understand the work presented in this paper. For further details, refer to the 3GPP specifications [1]. it contains the security algorithms and an individual key (K i ) which is a copy of the K i permanently stored on the USIM card of the subscriber. The IMSI value is public, and can be read from the device that mounts the USIM. The key, however, must remain secret, and must never be revealed by USIM and AuC.
UMTS overview
For this reason, the USIM provides functions, accessible to the ME, that can be 115 used during the authentication phase in order to obtain temporary keys from K i .
In this way, the secret K i is never revealed to the ME. starting from K ASME , and then sent to the eNB, which can thus activate the security procedures between eNB and MS. However, K ASME and K eNB are not directly used in cryptographic operations. LTE provides two mechanisms of 170 protection for two different classes of control traffic (Control Plane): Non Access Stratum (NAS) traffic, and Access Stratum (AS) traffic. NAS traffic consist of communications between MME and MS (forwarded in a "transparent" way through the eNB), while AS traffic (also called Radio Resource Control (RRC) traffic) includes the control messages between MS and eNB. For this reason, two 175 keys are derived from K ASME : K NASenc , used for encryption, and K NASint , used for integrity checking of NAS messages. Similarly, from K eNB , the keys K RRCenc and K RRCint are derived and used for AS messages. The user traffic (User Plane), is encrypted using a different key, called K UPenc . Integrity protection is not supported for this class of traffic.
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Finally, after a successful handover of the MS between two neighbor eNB, it is necessary to renew the K eNB [1] (TS 33.401). To do this, the MME derives a new value from the key K ASME , called Next Hop key, which is used, along with the previous K eNB , to generate the K eNB key (called K eNB ) used by the target eNB after the handover. Further details on these procedures and their analysis 185 can be found in [1] (TS 23.401 and TS 33.401) and [3] respectively.
Handover procedures
Handover procedures are activated by the serving network (eNB in LTE, RNC in UMTS) when the strength of the radio signal between a mobile station and the current eNodeB/NodeB becomes too much degraded. The decision of performing 190 a handover is taken by the eNB or RNC, which selects the target eNB/RNC from a list of neighbors (the list is previously known). When a neighbor with the same technology (LTE/UMTS) is not available for the handover, then a handover to a network with other technology is executed. Intra-Handover procedures are adopted when a user moves between different LTE cells, while Inter-RAT 195 procedures are adopted while moving from a radio access technology (GSM, UMTS, LTE, WiMAX or any other wireless technology) to another. These procedures are described in the 3GPP TS 23.401 and TS 33.401 specifications [1] . eNBs can be directly connected by an X2 interface which can be used to perform handover procedures. Every eNB is connected to the MME via the S1 200 interface. Both interfaces are IP based.
ProVerif overview
ProVerif [5] is a tool for automatic verification of cryptographic protocols, using theorem-proving techniques, where the protocol actors and the attacker are modeled according to the symbolic approach defined by Dolev and Yao [7] . 205 In this model, the attacker has complete control over communications channels and can read, delete, modify messages in transit or forge new messages. The symbolic representation of data and cryptography implies that encryption is considered ideal: the attacker can decipher an encrypted message only when he knows the right key. ProVerif may report false attacks, i.e. attacks which in reality are not possible.
As a consequence, when an attack is reported by ProVerif, in the form of an execution trace that violates the specified property, it is necessary to carefully analyze it in order to understand if it is a real attack. However, if a property is 220 reported as satisfied, then it is guaranteed to be true (ProVerif builds a formal proof for it), and no attack is feasible in the model.
Related work
Ben Henda and Norrman [3] recently used ProVerif to analyze the LTE procedures related to session management (used to establish security algorithms 225 between the mobile device and the network) and mobility (handover between two LTE cells). The procedures analyzed are: Network Access Stratum (NAS) security control procedure, i.e. security algorithm negotiation between MS and MME, NAS Service Request Procedure (security algorithm negotiation between MS and eNodeB), X2 handover, and S1 handover. The reported results show 230 that secrecy and agreement properties hold as expected. However, differently from our work, the analysis proposed in [3] does not consider the possibility that data encryption may be disabled and that some channels may lack IPSec protection, as allowed by the standard [1] (TS 33.401). Moreover, Ben Henda and Norrman do not consider the possibility of having emergency calls, nor 235 that an attacker may control one or more eNBs. Finally, we check a wider set of properties, including, for example, weak-secrecy, i.e. the inability of the adversary to distinguish a correct guess of a secret term from an incorrect guess.
The research community mainly focused on analyzing the Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) procedure and on proposing improvements in that 240 procedure [11] , [12] , [13] and [9] . LTE and UMTS authentication procedures are very similar, and only computation of keys and used algorithms differ. The UMTS AKA was formally analyzed using BAN logic in TS 33.902 [1] and, due to the similarity of the procedures, all analysis results carry over to LTE AKA.
Arapinis et al. [2] used ProVerif to analyze privacy aspects of UMTS. However, 245 the paging procedure analyzed is the same in LTE and UMTS technologies, so the results should be valid for both networks.
Qachri et al. [10] propose and analyze a system for handovers between different wireless network technologies (e.g. 3G, 4G, WiFi, WiMax). The proposed system has been formally verified with ProVerif. However, the paper does not provide 250 an analysis of the LTE network defined by the 3GPP standards.
Security requirements and threats
The handover procedures have different security requirements, as specified by the 3GPP standards. All the procedures, assuming that the mobile device is authenticated with the network components (MSC in UMTS, eNB and MME In order to counter security threats, communication among components of the home and serving network should be secured by the mobile operators that own the networks. While the risk of attacks on the MSC-MSC, MME-MME, MME-MSC and MSC-RNC links is not very relevant, because the involved nodes are not physically accessible, the same is not true for the eNB-MME and 275 eNB-eNB links, especially in the case of HeNBs, because these nodes are often located in publicly accessible locations, and hence they may be tampered with by a malicious attacker. The 3GPP TS 33.820 and 33.401 [1] specifications specify that the eNB-MME and eNB-eNB connections should be protected by IPsec, which guarantees authentication, integrity and confidentiality of data. Moreover, 280 Security Gateways (SeGW) should be used to handle the IPsec connections in the serving network. However, the 3GPP TS 33.401 [1] specification reports that, if the interfaces are trusted (e.g. physically protected), the use of IPsec based protection is not needed, depending on operator evaluations. In practice, the promiscuity of IPSec protected connections and physically protected connections, 285 summed to the fact that the number of LTE cells is rapidly growing, increases the probability of misconfiguration in the networks, thus leading to possible situations where some channels that should be protected by IPsec are not, thus being accessible by malicious attackers. Moreover, some operators underestimate the security issues and avoid using IPsec on their networks even when the risk 290 of attacks on the channels is not negligible. Reasons might be several: some operators fear that IPsec would increase both network complexity and traffic latency, others simply underestimate the problem as, for example, they assume that encryption is performed by applications, which is not always true. A clear presentation of all the possible motivations that are leading several network 295 operators to avoid using IPsec, and data about the adoption rate of IPSec, is
Finally, as HeNB are specifically designed to be placed in indoor spaces and public hotspots, in some cases they can be easily physically accessed by malicious attackers. The 3GPP TS 33.820 [1] specification describes all the 300 security requirements that that must be fulfilled by eNBs and HeNBs. An external attacker should not be able to access the sensitive data (e.g. private keys) stored in the eNB, even if he gets physical access to the hardware of the eNB. However, considering the complexity of eNBs (produced by different manufactures), and the increasing diffusion of them, it is practically impossible to ensure that all the eNBs are immune to external attacks. For this reason, the risk of having compromised eNBs controlled by an attacker should be considered.
Modeling handover procedures for security verification
Modeling choices
This section presents the main modeling choices made in developing the 310 formal models of the handover procedures. The final aim is to create models that faithfully represent the procedures to be analyzed but that are as simple as possible, so as to efficiently exploit the analysis tool ProVerif.
Omitting non-relevant data and operations
When modeling handover procedures for analyzing their security, only the 315 data and operations related to cryptography and authentication need to be included in the models, while information related to resource allocation and relocation is not relevant for the security analysis and can be omitted.
Abstracting algorithms and algorithm identifiers in key derivation functions 320
Since perfect cryptography is assumed in the Dolev-Yao attacker model, the handover models consider only whether encryption is enabled or not, no matter which algorithm is chosen. Therefore, the algorithms and the algorithm identifiers are abstracted away from key derivation functions. Subscriber Identification Number (MSIN), which identifies the subscriber within the HN. As the splitting of an IMSI into its components is not relevant for our 330 analysis, in this work a single value is used to represent the IMSI. As subscribers are uniquely identified by their IMSI, an IMSI is modeled as a fresh value, i.e. as a value generated before the start of the protocol and guaranteed to be unique.
Using a single fresh value to represent an IMSI
Fresh values are considered by ProVerif initially unknown and unguessable by the attacker, while in practice an active attacker can obtain a subscriber's IMSI 335 using so-called IMSI catchers. In order to take this into account, in the models the MS sends its IMSI in clear over the public channel in the first message. Thus, the attacker can learn the IMSI by eavesdropping on the public channel.
Modeling AKA procedures
As the handover procedures can be activated at any time, when the MS is 340 already authenticated with the serving network, and the previous authentication state is important, the model cannot just include the procedures themselves, but it needs to represent what may happen before the procedures are activated.
Most notably, the model should include the last AKA procedure that has been executed by the entities involved in the handover. As the inclusion of a full AKA 345 procedure model would make the overall model too complex to be analyzed 1 , the initial authentication is not fully modeled, but it is substituted by an equivalent model, which creates the same security context that is assumed to be established by the executed AKA procedure. This modeling choice was also adopted in [3] .
In each AKA equivalent model, a fresh term used as IMSI is first generated 350 by the MS, and whether to activate encryption or not is non-deterministically chosen, so as to consider both cases.
In the LTE to UMTS, LTE X2 and LTE S1 handover models each MS also generates a fresh term used as K ASME (that in reality is established during the AKA). Encryption selection and K ASME are inserted as values in private perfect 355 hash tables, shared only with the MME and called capab and keys. In these tables, the corresponding IMSI is used as key for selecting the corresponding values. So, the MME can retrieve the correct values for each MS from these hash tables, by using the IMSI value (which is public). In other words, the agreement achieved by the initial AKA context setup is replaced by the two shared tables.
Such tables, being private, cannot be accessed by the attacker. Here are the ProVerif code segments that represent the handling of the shared data:
( * define two tables * ) t a b l e k e y s ( i d e n t , asmeKey ) . corresponding IMSI value (which is public) is used as key for addressing these tables, thus allowing the MSC to retrieve the correct values for each MS.
Modeling communication channels
Communication channels are modeled according to the considerations made in Section 4, i.e. considering that the MSC-MSC, MME-MME, MME-MSC and 390 MSC-RNC links are generally not physically accessible to attackers, while the eNB-MME and eNB-eNB links may be accessible either because of misconfigurations (i.e. not using IPsec on non physically protected links) or because an attacker compromises one or more eNBs thus obtaining control of the commu-nication channels connected to those eNBs. Accordingly, in our analysis we 395 assume that the MSC-MSC, MME-MME, MME-MSC and MSC-RNC links are secure channels, i.e. not accessible by the attacker, whereas for the eNB-MME and eNB-eNB links we explore both the case that the channels are secured, and hence actually not accessible by the attacker, and the case that an attacker may be able to control the channels. 400 One simple possible way of modeling a secure channel in ProVerif is to use a private channel, which, by definition, cannot be accessed by the attacker. A second possible way is by encrypting the data that flow through the channel with secret keys that are shared by the end-points of the channel, are not known to the attacker, and are never disclosed. With this solution, the impossibility 405 for the attacker to access the secure channel is guaranteed by the Dolev-Yao attacker model which assumes perfect cryptography. The latter method is more complex than the one using a private channel. For this reason, the ProVerif models used in this work adopt the former approach: Since the processes (corresponding to eNBs) that have been defined in the ProVerif models used in this analysis do not create any fresh term (using the ProVerif new statement), the scenario where an eNB is compromised and controlled by the attacker corresponds exactly to the scenario where all the 415 channels connected to that eNB are not secure (i.e. defined as ProVerif public channels).
Modeling message headers
Each message has a header that identifies the type of message content. In our model, headers are defined as constants. Each process that receives a message 420 checks if the message header matches the one expected for the current input instruction. If it does not match, the message is immediately discarded by the process: This solution faithfully represents the way input messages have to be checked but at the same time it keeps a low footprint on the state space size of the model. Before and after the handover procedures take place, data messages can be exchanged. This is taken into account, but only the exchange of two data messages is included, one before the procedure starts and one after its completion, because exchanging more messages would not add anything significant to the model. These messages are also used to check the secrecy of the data traffic 455 when encryption is enabled. The disclosure operation models the fact that a counter can be eventually 470 guessed by an attacker, because it is a bounded integer value. Using a private fresh term does not correctly represent a counter in the model, because a fresh term is unguessable. Disclosing the fresh term used as counter is an acceptable approximation because it adds the counter value to the attacker knowledge database, and covers the case when the attacker guesses the counter value. This 475 design choice was already adopted in [3] .
Simplifying transmission paths
In order to reduce the complexity of the analysis, some messages in the models do not follow the real path from source to target, but they follow a simplified path. integrity checks are disabled. The same IMSI is used to start a MS process that 510 models an emergency terminal (unauthenticated), and one process that follows the authenticated session. By adopting this approach, the models consider the possibility that the same IMSI is used at the same time for an authenticated session and for an emergency session. This possibility in reality may happen if an attacker uses the IMSI to start an emergency session, while the legitimate 515 user is connected to the network.
Procedure models
The next subsections give an informal description of the procedure models used for security verification, in the form of charts. The models have been derived from the procedure descriptions given in 3GPP TS 23.401 and TS 33.401
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[1] specifications, but omitting non security relevant data and operations and following the design choices detailed above.
The equivalent model that substitutes the AKA procedures is inserted at the beginning of each handover procedure model, in order to represent the establishment of the security context assumed before starting the handover 525 procedure itself. Just after the first two messages representing the initial AKA equivalent model, a third message exchange is inserted before starting each handover procedure itself. This message represents a user data exchange between MS and eNB/MME/RNC, done before the handover procedure itself. These initial messages can be seen, for example, in the chart in Figure 3 , which 530 represents the messages exchanged during a LTE to UMTS handover. After the first three context messages already explained, the handover is 540 activated by the eNB with the HANDOVER REQUIRED message, which informs the MME that the procedure must be performed for the user identified by the IMSI contained in the message. The MME derives the new CK and IK UMTS keys from the previous K ASME and the NAS downlink count value. The the SMC COMPLETE messages. The last message represents data exchange after the handover, as already discussed.
UMTS to LTE
Handover from UMTS to LTE (Figure 4) 
LTE X2
The X2 handover ( Figure 5) is an LTE to LTE handover procedure. The fundamental characteristic of the X2 procedure is the fact that the handover is performed between two eNB, without MME intervention. Indeed, the MME is informed that the handover has been performed after the procedure completed.
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An X2 handover can be executed between two eNB only if they are directly connected via the X2 interface. Otherwise, an S1 handover must be performed (Section 5.2.4).
The X2 handover is initiated by the SeNB (Source eNodeB) deriving the K eNB key from the current K eNB and the Target Cell ID, an identifier that is 595 associated by the SeNB to the TeNB (Target eNodeB). The Target Cell ID is modeled as a fresh term that is disclosed to the attacker, because this ID is known by any MS that connects to the eNB, thus the attacker can obtain it by starting a legitimate connection to the eNB. The SeNB informs the TeNB that the handover is starting, by sending K eNB , MS identity and encryption 600 capability in the HANDOVER REQUEST message.
The TeNB derives the new set of keys (K RRCenc , K RRCint and K UPenc ) from the received K eNB , and informs the SeNB that it is ready to accept the connection from MS (HANDOVER REQUEST ACKNOWLEDGE message).
Then, the SeNB sends all the information required (encryption capability, that 605 the MS checks to be corresponding to the value selected at the beginning, and Target Cell ID) to the MS in a RRC CONNECTION RECONFIGURATION message. Now the MS can derive the new K eNB key and all the subsequent keys (K RRCenc , K RRCint and K UPenc ) that are used to communicate with the TeNB.
Thus, the MS disconnects from the SeNB and sends a RRC CONNECTION 610 RECONFIGURATION COMPLETE message to the TeNB. When the TeNB receives this message, it can start to communicate with the MS. Then, the TeNB informs the MME that an X2 handover has been performed with the PATH SWITCH REQUEST. The MME derives two new keys, called next hop key 1 (from K eNB and K ASME ) and next hop key 2 (from next hop key 1 and K ASME ).
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The next hop key 2 is sent to the TeNB in the PATH SWITCH REQUEST ACKNOWLEDGE message, and must be used by the TeNB to derive another K eNB for the next handover. This implies a two-step forward key separation, because even though the SeNB can derive the key used for the TeNB, it cannot derive a key for the next target eNB. Finally, the last message represents data 620 exchange after the handover.
MS SeNB
Generate imsi Select encryption = true/false Generate KASME Insert 
LTE S1
The S1 handover ( Figure 6) is an LTE to LTE handover procedure. Differently from the X2 handover (Section 5.2.3), the S1 handover procedure requires the intervention of the MME.
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The S1 handover is initiated by the SeNB deriving the K eNB key from the current K eNB and the Target Cell ID (an identifier that is associated by the SeNB to the TeNB, modeled as a fresh term that is disclosed to the attacker). The
SeNB informs the MME of the necessity that a handover is required, by sending K eNB , MS identity and encryption capability in the HANDOVER REQUIRED 630 message.
The MME derives two new keys, called next hop key 1 (from K eNB and K ASME ) and next hop key 2 (from next hop key 1 and K ASME Finally, the last message represents data exchange after the handover.
The S1 handover procedure implies a one-step forward key separation: the SeNB cannot derive the key used in TeNB when the handover is completed, because the keying material of the TeNB is provided directly by the MME.
Security properties specification 650
The main security properties that the handover procedures are expected to guarantee have been specified as follows (the way these properties have been expressed in ProVerif is shown in Appendix A): • Forward secrecy and backward secrecy of keys: the compromise of a secret 665 key must not affect the confidentiality of future keys (forward secrecy) and of earlier keys (backward secrecy). In the handover from LTE to UMTS, forward secrecy is specified as the inability of the attacker to derive UMTS keys (CK , IK ) when he knows K eNB . Likewise, in the handover from UMTS to LTE, forward secrecy is specified as the inability of the attacker 670 to derive LTE keys (K ASME , K eNB ) when he knows CK and IK. In both X2
and S1 LTE to LTE handovers, forward secrecy is specified as the inability of the attacker to derive the K eNB key used in the target eNB when he knows the K eNB used in the source eNB. Backward secrecy is defined as the inability of the attacker to derive K eNB from CK and IK in the first 675 case, to derive CK and IK from K eNB in the second case, and to derive K eNB from K eNB in the LTE S1 and X2 cases.
• Immunity to off-line guessing attacks: a term is a weak-secret if it is vulnerable to brute-force off-line guessing, and the attacker has the ability to verify if a guessed value is indeed the weak-secret without further 680 interaction after an execution of the protocol. In the handover models, the payloads are data that could be guessed, so it is specified that they must not be weak-secrets.
• Authentication: in the LTE to UMTS and UMTS to LTE handover models, the following authentication properties between the MS and the SN (eNB 685 and RNC) are specified : (i) the MS is authenticated to the source network, (ii) the MS is authenticated to the target network (if the handover procedure has completed successfully), (iii) each time the MS successfully concludes a handover, then the MME previously derived the same keys (K ASME or CK /IK ). In the LTE to LTE handover models (both X2 and S1), two 690 authentication queries similar to the first two ones of the LTE to UMTS and UMTS to LTE handovers have been defined: (i) the MS is authenticated to the source eNB, and (ii) the MS is authenticated to the target eNB (if the handover procedure has completed successfully). The third query about the identity of derived keys is useless in this case, because no new 695 key is derived, but the K ASME , K NASenc and K NASint keys, shared between MS and MME, do not change during the handover.
Verification results
As already explained, all handover types have been analyzed considering both the case that the eNB-MME link includes IPsec or physical protection, and 700 the case that it does not. This produces two different models for each handover type: the two models differ only in the definition of the eNB-MME channel (private in the first case, public in the latter case).
It is worth noting that each property has been verified independently. This is necessary not only for limiting the complexity of the analysis, but also because 705 different properties require different assumptions. For example, when verifying backward/forward secrecy, some keys are intentionally disclosed to the attacker, while the same must not happen when verifying other properties. Table 1 resumes the results of the formal analysis of the LTE to UMTS 710 handover model.
LTE to UMTS
The second column of Table 1 contains the results of the analysis when the channel between eNB and MME is private, i.e. the adversary has no access to it.
These results confirm that all the expected properties hold: all keys (K ASME , K eNB and derived) remain secret; forward and backward secrecy are valid; the 715 payloads are conditionally secret and are not weak-secrets, and authentication properties hold.
The third column of Table 1 refers to the case of a public eNB-MME channel (the adversary can spoof, delete and transmit new messages over the channel).
In this scenario, the attacker can know a subset of the LTE keys: K eNB and the 720 derived keys K RRCenc , K RRCint and K UPenc . However, K ASME and the UMTS keys (CK /IK ) are kept secret. The disclosure of K eNB makes the LTE payload not secret (the attacker can derive the ciphering key K UPenc ), which also invalids the immunity to guessing attacks on the LTE payload. Instead, the secrecy of the UMTS payload is preserved, because CK remains secret, as well as the immunity 725 to guessing attacks on the UMTS payload. In this scenario, backward secrecy is not valid: the attacker directly knows K eNB . Instead, forward secrecy is kept: the attacker never knows K ASME , so he has no way to derive CK and IK . Finally, the authentication between MS and eNB does not hold: an attacker can force a handover of the MS from LTE to UMTS. In fact, the attacker, knowing the IMSI 730 and having access to the eNB-MME channel, can initiate an arbitrary handover by sending a forged HANDOVER REQUIRED message to the MME. The MS cannot recognize the attacker because the handover procedure continues as in a regular handover, and receives a genuine HANDOVER COMMAND message from the network. The attacker never knows K ASME : if the handover completes 735 in the MS, then the MME must have previously derived, in a corresponding session, the CK and IK keys from K ASME , so MME and MS are correctly authenticated during the handover. Similarly, the attacker has no access to the 3G serving network and, from the previous properties, to the CK and IK keys:
the attacker cannot alter communications between RNC and MS and, when the 740 handover procedure completes, the MS and the UMTS SN are authenticated.
UMTS to LTE
The same considerations made for the two previous scenarios are also applicable to the other handover procedure, from UMTS to LTE (second and third column in The results about authentication are the same, albeit their explanation is different. Lack of authentication between MS and eNB, in the last scenario, makes the adversary able to alter all subsequent Access Stratum and User Plane 755 communications between MS and eNB. However, the attacker cannot read and modify Non Access Stratum messages between MS and MME. For this reason MS-MME authentication remains valid: if the handover completes in the MS, then the MME ran a session where the K ASME key was derived, so MME and MS are authenticated during the handover. Finally, before starting the handover,
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MS-RNC are authenticated, as confirmed by the last query, because the attacker has no access to the UMTS network. In this handover scenario, for the three channels has been considered the possibility that each channel may be insecure. Thus, a total of eight combinations are possible, when channels are alternatively considered as private or public channels. In certain cases, ProVerif is not able to verify all the properties ("unres", i.e. unresolved, cells in Table 3 ).
LTE X2
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In the X2 handover, forward secrecy never holds, as already known from the specifications [1] (TS 33.401).
The columns of Table 3 confirm that the security properties of the current handover procedure are not influenced by the protection on the TeNB-MME channel: this can be explained because the only key that is transmitted on 775 that channel is the Next Hop Key 2, which will be eventually used in the next handover. However, the next handover may be compromised if the attacker has the Next Hop Key 2. If this happens, during the following handover the security properties will not hold.
The fourth and fifth columns consider the case when the the SeNB-TeNB 780 channel is protected while the SeNB-MME channel lacks protection. In this scenario, the attacker obtains K eNB from the second message, and can derive all the subsequent keys. Moreover, if the TeNB-MME channel is also unprotected (fifth column), the attacker can read the Next Hop Key 2 sent by the MME. able to resolve this query). Table 4 resumes the results of the formal analysis of the LTE S1 handover model.
LTE S1
In this handover scenario, for the SeNB-MME and TeNB-MME channels, 820 both the case of protected channel and the case of unprotected channel have been considered, for a total of four different scenarios (note that in this kind of handover there is no SeNB-TeNB channel, see Section 5.2.4).
The second column of Table 4 [3] , regrading authentication and secrecy in LTE X2 and S1 handovers, Results confirm that, under the assumptions made, almost all the properties that have been considered hold when eNB-MME and eNB-eNB channels are 890 protected in all the four handover procedures. The only property that does not hold is forward secrecy (as defined in Section 5.2) in the UMTS to LTE and the X2 handovers. Moreover, it is possible to confirm that the emergency sessions do not disclose to the attackers data that can be used to break network security during handover procedures.
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In the case of unprotected eNB-MME or eNB-eNB channels, or if the eNB connected to those channels is controlled by the attacker, results show which properties are broken and which remain valid under the assumptions made. When having access to the eNB-MME channels, an attacker can force a handover from LTE to UMTS, or control the Access Stratum and User Plane communications 900 after a handover from UMTS to LTE. However, the main LTE key (K ASME ) and the UMTS keys (CK /IK ) are kept secret.
In the LTE to LTE procedures a greater number of combinations are possible, because the channels that may be considered insecure are 2 (S1 handover), or 3 (X2 handover). In both the handover cases, the attacker can alter sections, or 905 the entire handover process, depending on which channels he controls.
Finally, results highlight that the handover procedure from UMTS to LTE does not provide forward secrecy of the keys, with respect to the definition given in Section 5.2. Similarly, the X2 handover never guarantees forward secrecy, but
this is a precise 3GPP design choice in order to obtain a very fast handover 910 procedure, which is particularly useful for fast-moving users and devices.
A total of 16 ProVerif models have been analyzed. All the handover procedure were verified considering the possibility that the attacker can control the channel between eNB and MME and between eNB and eNB.
is used here for describing how the security properties specified in section 5.3 have been expressed in ProVerif. All the other handover models follow the same 
